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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
A Municipal Corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent: 
vs. 
DEBBIE L. , HANNA Case No. 17081 
Defendant and Appellant: 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
---0000000---
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a violation of 
§3B-8~5(3) of the Revised Ordinances of the City of South 
Salt Lake (1974 as amended) which ordinance Appellant 
claims is unconstitutional and invalid. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
-
This Class B Misdemeanor was first prosecuted in the 
South Salt Lake Justice Court and was tried without a jury 
before Judge, George H. Searle on January 15, 1980.· The 
conviction in that trial was appealed on February 5, 1980, 
and the matter was retried before a jury on March 28, 1980. 
This trial resulted in a second conviction and a judgment 
on that conviction by Judge Christine M. Durham. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction 
and a determination that the ordinance of the City of South 
Salt Lake under which she was convicted is unconstitutional 
and invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was employed, on October 17, 1979, as a 
masseur in a massage establislunent and health studio known 
as The King's Palace, located at 60 West 3300 South, in the 
City of South Salt Lake, Salt Lake County. On that evening, 
Officer James L. Burns, a Salt Lake Vice Officer on duty as 
a special officer of the South Salt Lake Police Department 
entered the premises and purchased a massage. Officer Burns 
testified that during the course of the massage, he stated to 
the Defendant that he had expected something different from 
what he was getting, and specifically that in previous massage 
parlor encounters, the masseuse had been nude. He then test· 
if ied that the Defendant stated that there were "extras 
available" and that for $20.00 he could receive a "local". 
He testified that it was his experience that a ''local" was 
• 
a massage of the genitals. The Defendant was plaGed under 
arrest by Officer Burns and others on the premises of The 
King's Palace for alleged violation of §3B-8-5(3) of the 
Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake (1974 as 
amended) which states that "it shall be unlawful for a 
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masseur to touch or offer to touch or massage the genitalia 
of customers." Section 3B-8-8 of the Revised Ordinances of 
the City of South Salt Lake ·goes on to make such a violation 
a class B misdemeanor. 
Prior to jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Defendant was previously found guilty in the Justice Court of 
the City of South Salt Lake, sitting without a jury. An 
appeal was taken from that decision. Prior to the first trial, 
a motion to dismiss based on the invalidity of the subject 
ordinance was presented to the Justice Court in writing, 
accompanied by a memorandum in support thereof, which motion 
was denied. A similar motion was made in the Third Judicial 
District Court prior to trial in the instant case, and that 
Court refused to hear oral arguments on the matter before 
denying it, based upon the prior decision of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, denying 
declaratory relief against the same ordinance, based also 
upon its invalidity. The accompanying motion to dismiss 
the charge because of entrapment on the part of the police 
officer was also denied by the Third Judicial Di$trict Court, 
after a hearing thereon. The previous attempt to have this 
I f 
ordinance declared invalid in a declaratory judgment action 
is now pending before this Court in Hollingsworth vs. City of 
South Salt Lake, Case No. 16831. The arguments to follow are 
in large part based upon arguments set forth in appellants' 
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brief in the previous matter. 
ARGlll1ENT 
POINT I 
.SECTION 3B-8-5(3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH 
SALT LAKE IS INVALID AS EXCEEDING THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY 
GIVEN TO CITIES BY ARTICLE XI SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE. IN 
ADDITION, THIS SECTION VIOLATES ARTICLE I SECTION 24 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah, in Article XI, 
Section 5 grants cities "the authority to exercise all powers 
relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce with-
in its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations 
not in conflict with the general law . . . • 11 (emphasis added) 
To this is added the language of Article I Section 24 stating 
that "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." Obviously allowing cities to pass ordinances 
changing the effect of general state laws within the bound-
aries would render these laws less than uniform in operation. 
This the Constitution forbids. The legislature has enum-
erated what these powers are in §10-8-1 et seq. u.q.A. In 
Salt Lake City vs. Sutter, 61 U. 533, 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923) 
this Court ruled that the legislature does have the power 
to enumerate powers of cities, and that all powers and 
rnunicipalities are derived from the legislature. 
Section 10-8-41 U.C.A. states that cities: 
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. . . may supress and prohibit the keeping 
of disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or 
assignation, or houses kept by, maintained 
for, or resorted to or used by, one or more 
persons for acts of perversion, lewdness or 
prostitution within the limits of the city 
and within three miles of the outer bounder-
ies thereof, and may prohibit resorting there-
to for any of the purposes aforesaid; they may 
also make it unlawful for any person to commit 
or of fer or agree to commit an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral per-
version within the city, or for any person to 
secure, induce, procure, offer or transport to 
any place within the city any person for the 
purpose of committing an act of sexual inter-
course for hire, lewdness or moral perversion, 
or for any person to receive or of fer or 
agree to receive or direct any person into 
any place or building within the city for 
the purpose of connnitting an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral 
perversion, or for any person to aid, abet 
or participate in the connnission of any of 
the foregoing; and they may also stress and 
prohibit gambling houses and gambling, lotter-
ies and all fraudulent devices and practices, 
and all kinds of gaming, playing at dice or 
cards, and other games of chance, and the sale, 
distribution or exhibition of obscene or lewd 
publications, prints, pictures or illustrations. 
Section 10-8-51.U.C.A. gives the city further powers in 
the area of prostitution, as follows: 
This may provide for the punislunent of tramps, 
street beggars, prostitutes, habitual disturbers 
of the peace, pickpockets, gamblers and thieves, 
or persons who practice a~y game, trick or device 
with intent to swindle. 
I 
In addition to the statutes cited, §10-8-84 U.C.A. states: 
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and 
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging 
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, 
and such as are necessary and proper to provide 
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for the safety and preserve the health, and 
promote the prosperity, improve the mora~s, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience 
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and 
for the protection of property therein; and 
may enforce obedience to such ordinances with 
such fines or penalties as they may deem proper; 
provided, that the punishment of any offense 
shall be by fine in any sum less than $300.00 
or by imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, or 
by both such fine and imprisonment. (emphasis 
added). 
These three statutes were cited by the City of Salt Lake as 
authority for passing the ordinance at issue in the case of 
Salt Lake City vs. Allred, 19 U.2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (Utah 
1967). Defendant in that case was convicted of violating 
a city ordinance by "aiding and abetting in the connnission 
of a crime in that the Defendant directed a police officer 
to a certain apartment to obtain sexual intercourse for 
hire." 430 P.2d at 372. 
There as here, the ordinance was attacked as being 
beyond the power of the city, under the grant of authority 
given them by the legislature. The Court, in answer to that 
question, in specifically referring to the three statutes 
already cited by Defendant stated: 
It will be noted that the first two of the statutes 
above referred to deal with prostitution .. While 
the' ordinance we are considering contains no 
definitions of the terms used therein, nevertheless, 
it is quite evident that the ordinance was not 
designed to deal with prostitution. ~The generally 
accepted definition of rostitution is the ractice 
o a ema e o erin er o to in iscriminate 
sexua intercourse with men. The ordinance in 
ruestion goes beyond the grant of power by the 
e islature to the cities to SU ress rostitution. 
30 P. d at 37 . Emphasis a e 
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Further, the Court stated that: 
It is elementary that municipalities are limited 
by express grants of power from the legislature 
or as necessarily implied from such grants. It 
ap~ears that the ordinance we have under consider-
ation goes beyond the grant that any legislative 
authority granted to the city and is therefore 
invalid. 430 P.2d at 373. 
The Court held for Defendant, but later reversed itself, on 
a petition for rehearing (See Salt Lake City vs. Allred 20 
U.2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968)) when one Justice dis-
qualified himself, allowing a District Court Judge to sit. 
The Court appeared then to change its mind on the construe-
tion of §10-8-84 U.C.A. and stated that it gave the city much 
wider power than those pow~rs given by §§10-8-41 and 10-8-51 
U.C.A. Judge Cowley, now speaking for the Court stated: 
It is a well settled rule that it is a proper 
exercise of the police power as set forth in 
th~ above statute to preserve and protect the 
public morals, and any practice of business 
which has a tendency to weaken or corrupt the 
morals of those who follow it, as shown by 
experience, is such conduct as affects the public 
morals. 437 P.2d at 435. 
We are of the opinion that the general police 
power is a sufficient grant of authority to 
authorize the city ordinance involved in this 
case unless."Krohibited ~statute~ inconsis-
tent flierewit ." 437 P.20 at 436 (emphasis added) 
This language, of course, must be viewed somewhat cautiously, 
as it was done in a sharply divided case, with a District Court 
Judge deciding the balance of power, and was decided well before 
other cases appearing to cut back sharply on the power which the 
Allred Court allowed the city to exercise. Those cas·es will be 
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cited further on in this brief. In addition, the Court relied, 
in its decision in Allred, on the absence of conflict between 
the state statute and the city ordinance, and the harmony 
between them. There is no such harmony in this case. Further, 
there are observations in the dissents of the two Justices who 
had previously been in the majority, worth presenting. Justice 
Tuckett stated: 
I dissent. After carefully co11sidering the main 
opinion and the legal problems raised by this appeal, 
I am constrained to adhere to the position taken 
in the prior opinion of the court. I do not agree 
that the general grant of police power to the 
cities by §10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953) was intended 
by the legislature to authorize adoption of the 
ordinance we are here concerned with. It would 
seem that had the legislature intended such broad 
powers it would not have made specific grants of 
power to cities to deal with certain aspects of 
prostitution as provided for by §10-8-41 and 
§10-8-51, U.C.A. (1953). The latter statutes 
would be unnecessary and superfluous. 437 P.2d 
at 438. 
Justice Henriod, supporting Justice Tuckett, stated: 
The two dissenters in the former case cast their 
lot entirely under title 10-8-41, U.C.A. (1953). 
The author of the opinion in the present case pays 
no attention to those votes but bases his conclu-
sion entirell on title 10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), and 
does not ass gn 10-8-41 as a basis for his con-
clusion. It would seem to me that this new departure 
amounts to a dissent from the dissenters. Under 
such circumstances it appears to be sort of an 
aff!rmance, not reversal of the former case. 
437 P.2d at 438. 
In the fonner case Mr. Justice Tuckett simply said 
what every lawyer should know, that cities cannot 
exercise powers not delegated to them by the state 
of its constitution. Each Justice soundly and 
fundamentally said that the subject ordinance 
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not 
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so delegated. 437 P.2d at 439. 
In the second Allred decision, the Court ruled that the 
ordinance in question prohibited an act intimately associated 
with prostitution and~ that the city, in aiding the state in 
stopping prostitution, could make the one extra step to make 
it more difficult for prostitution to flourish. The city is 
not doing that· here. They are, instead, making a new class 
of sexual offense and the ordinance, as will be shown, is 
not only out of harmony and inconsistent with the statute, 
it is in direct conflict with it. 
Since the Allred decisions, this Court has had several 
occasions to rule on· the powers of municipalities to make 
ordinances in-be same· area regulated by the state. The Court 
has uniformally ruled that if the state is already regulating 
that area of the law, ·the city should not be involved. In 
State vs. Salt Lake city, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) this Court 
ruled invalid an ordinance of Salt Lake City licensing private 
non-profit social clubs. The city had simply copied the state 
licensing requirement, changing only enough words to make it 
apply to city officers, rather than state officers. The Court 
quoted extensively from Abbott vs. City of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 158, 349 P.2d 974 {€al. 1960) in stating that 
\ 
the invalidity arises, not from conflict of language, 
but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which 
would result from.dual regulations covering the same 
ground. Only by such a broad definition of 'conflict' 
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is it possible to confine local legislation to its 
proper field of supplementary regulation. 44SP.2d 
at 694. 
In Allgood vs. Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) the 
Defendant was convicted of a violation of §32-3-3 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. That ordinance made the crime 
of trespass a class B misdemeanor. Section 76-6-206(3) of the 
Utah Code made the same crime an infraction, for which no 
jail sentence could be imposed. The criminal Defendant success-
fully obtained a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial 
District Court, and that Writ was upheld by this Court. The 
Court, in upholding the Writ, declared: 
The District Court ruled that "since the state 
law provides no jail sentence for trespass, which 
is classified as an 'an infraction,' that the 
city cannot impose a greater sentence than that 
provided by state law, and it is for that reason 
that the Court grants the petition ofr a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and affirm 
the trial Court. 
Further, the Court quoted from McQuillian, ~nicipal 
Corporations, §17.15, at page 326, in declaring the law in Utah: 
... if the.ordinance penalty conflicts with 
that· of the general law of the state covering 
the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void 
The charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that 
of the state law. 545 P.2d at 532. 
Justice Crockett in dissent stated as follows: 
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The legislature has specifically granted authority 
to the city to prohibit criminal trespass by 
§10-8-50, Utah Code Annotated 1953, wherein it 
states that cities have the power to: 
. . . rovide for the unishment of tres ass 
and such ot er petty o enses as the oard of 
conunissioners or city council may deem proper. 
545 P.2d at 532 . 
.. 
In other words, the majority of the Court ruled that a 
City may not decide the punishment of a crime, when that 
punishment appears to conflict with the state pronouncement 
on the same subject, even though there is a specific grant 
of authority for so setting the penalty. The state, then, 
by making a later pronouncement of public policy, is deemed 
to have overruled its earlier pronouncement that cities 
exercise spec~fic grants of power. In this case, the state 
has defined the perimeters of ~hat is and is not illegal 
sexual conduct, and any previous grant of power to the 
city, is not sufficient to override -what the state has 
pronounced. 
In the case of Layton City vs. Speth, 5-78 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1978) Defendant was convicted under a city ordinance 
which duplicated the langu~ge of §58-37-8(2)(ii) which 
stated that it shall be unlawful: 
For any owner, tenant, licensee, or person 
in -control of any building, room, 'tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowlingly and intentionally to permit the 
same to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled 
substances therein. 
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The Court, apparently returning once again to the more 
strict construction of the statutes granting legislative 
authority to the cities which characterized the earlier 
opinion in Salt Lake City vs. Allred, ruled the ordinance 
must be set aside, in the following language: 
At the time of the alleged offense the statutes 
of Utah permitted cities certain powers including 
a prohibition against " .•. the sale, giving 
away or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or 
narcotics, or of tobacco to any person under 21 
years of age: . . . The statute has since been 
amended but the amendment has no bearing on the 
present case. 
Cities are also empowered by statute to pass 
all ordinances, rules, and regulations for 
carrying into effect all powers and duties 
conferred and "such as are necessary and 
proper to provide for the safety and preserve 
the health, and promote prosperity, !mprove 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort 
and convenience of the city and the inhabi-
tants thereof, ... 
The ordinance in question is not one which 
is necessary for carrying into effect any of 
the purposes above mentioned. 578 P.2d at 829. 
While, then, the second Allred decision appeared to give 
cities a grant of authority to protect safety, health, morals, 
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the city, which 
grant of authority was in addition to the many specified grants, 
the Layton City vs. Speth decision, appears to make. that pos-
ition untenable. In fact, in that decision, the Court very 
clearly made a rather strict interpretation of what the city 
can and cannot do in the area of drugs. The Court clarified 
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its view of city powers even further, in stating: 
By the statute it is clear that the only 
authority given to the city was to prohibit 
anyone from selling, giving away, or furnish-
ing marijuana to a person under 21 years of 
age. Mr. Speth is not charged with doing any 
of those unlawful acts; and that part of the 
ordinance which attempts to make it unlawful 
for an owner of an automobile, knowingly and 
intentionally, to permit persons to occupy it 
and possess, use, or distribute marijuana must 
be held to be beyond the power of the city to 
enact. The ordinance is, therefore, invalid. 
578 P.2d at 829. 
Although the Court then went on to determine that there was 
a conflict in penalties, in that a second offense under the 
state statute was treated more harshly than a second offense 
under the city ordinance, it is clear that the Court did 
not make this decision based on the difference of penalties. 
The Court made its decision based on the fundamental decision 
that the city did not have a wide range of additional police 
powers not specifically granted in Title 10 Chapter 8 of 
the Utah Code. Obviously the city had a strong argument 
that the ordinance was protective of the public health, 
safety and morals. In fact, assuming that the state was 
correct in labeling marijuana a dangerous drug in the first 
place, such an ordinance on the part of the city may well 
\ 
have exercised the protective functions that the city stated 
as justification. Nevertheless, the ordinance was both beyond 
the power of the city to enact, lacking a specific grant of 
authority, and was in conflict with state regulations in 
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the area. 
A. brief reference should be made here to §§76-10-1201 
through ·76-10-1226 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, in which the 
State of Utah takes a strong stand against public displays of 
nudity and other sexual activities. In this series of statutes 
the state legislature recognized that it was enacting a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation regarding pornography and similar 
offense. It therefore, in § 76-10-1210 specifically gave authorit~ 
to the cities to further regulate the materials complained of. 
It does not appear the legislature felt that cities would have 
such authority without the specific delegation of that statute, 
despite the language of §10-8-84 seemingly giving the cities 
broad authority to improve the public morals. The legislature 
wanted it clear that cities have the right especially to protect 
minors against materials which might otherwise be too readily 
available for them. It was the·intent of the legislature, as 
specifically stated·· in §76-10-1210(3) "to give the broadest mean· 
ing permissable under the federal and state constitutions to 
the words offends public decency' in §76-10-803." Section 76-
10-803 defines a "public nuisance" but note that such broad 
l~nguage is confined to the area of pornography, prqhibited 
by the above cited statutes. No such broad declaration on the 
part of the legislature has been enacted to give cities like 
authority in the area at issue 
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here. That can only be due to a decision on the part of 
the legislature that the conduct they have proscribed with 
the proper proscription to be applied to consentual adult 
activity in a non-public place. 
The public policy of the State of Utah regarding 
illegal sexual activity is clearly defined in §76-10-1301 
eq seq. U.C.A. (1953) as amended. Section 76-10-1301 defines 
"sexual activity" and ''house of prostitution" as follows: 
(1) ''Sexual activity'' means intercourse or any 
sexual act involving the genitals of one person 
and the mouth or anus of another person, regard-
less of the sex of either participant. 
(2) "House of prostitution" means a plac.e where 
prostitution or promotion of prostitution is 
regularly carried on by one or more persons 
under the control, management, or supervision 
of another. 
Section 76-10-1302 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, then goes 
on to prohibit prostitution in the following words: 
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when: 
(a) he engages or offers or agrees to engage 
in any sexual activity with another person 
for fees; or 
(b) is an inmate of a "house of prostitution"; 
or, 
(c) loiters in or within view of any public 
place for the purpose of being hired to 
engage in sexual activity. 
(2)· Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor, pro-
vided that any person who was twice convicted 
under this section shall be guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. ' 
It could easily be argued, under the doctrines set forth 
in Layton City vs. Speth, that any regulation of prostitution 
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whatsoever on a local level is now void, as being in conflict 
with the state law. The penalty phase, seen as sufficient 
conflict in both the Layton City vs. Speth and Allgood vs. 
Larsen. cases, must be in dispute, as cities have no power to 
pass ordinances punishable on the second offense as a class 
"A" misdemeanor. While the court is not asked here to 
determine whether cities have any power under present circum-
stances to regulate prostitution at all, there is surely a 
question presented in this case as to whether cities may 
re-define prostitution, thus coming in direct conflict with 
state law and depriving state law of its uniform effect, 
contrary to Article XI Section 5 and Article I Section 24 of 
the Constitution of Utah. Reference should again be made 
here to the fact that the South Salt Lake ordinance at 
issue is a copy of an ordinance passed a few months before 
the South Salt Lake ordinance, by Salt Lake County. For 
sometime before passing the present county massage ordinance, 
Salt Lake County has had in effect §16-23-4 of their 
revised ordinances, defining and punishing prostitution. 
The act reads as follows: 
Section 16-23-4. Prostitution. 
(l)· Any female person who performs, solicits 
offers or agrees to perform any of the 
following acts for money or other consid-
eration commits an act of prostitution: 
(a) Any act of sexual intercouse· or 
(b) Any act of deviant sexual co~duct. 
(2) Deviant sexual conduct for the purpose of 
this section means: 
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(a) Any act of sexual gratification involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another. 
(b) Any lewd fondling or touching of either 
the female erson or male erson with the 
intent to arouse or sat1s y t e sexua 
desires of either the male erson, female 
person, or 
(3) A person convicted of prostitution shall be 
fined not to exceed $299 or imprisoned in the 
county jail not to exceed 6 months, or both. 
(Emphasis added). 
Salt Lake County, then, has passed an ordinance in· direct 
conflict with the prostitution statute of the State of Utah. 
In all areas of the state outside of Salt Lake County, pros-
titution means one thing, and in Salt Lake County, it means 
far more. Even the most tortured reading of the second Allred 
decision does not give the county authority'for doing·this. 
The fact that the ordinance was pass~d long before the new 
criminal code defining what prostitution is in the State of 
Utah, would seem to read a simply overruling of the county by 
the state. Going back to the second Allred decision, the 
majority of the court~ upon rehearing, stated~ 
There is nothing in the state statutes regulating 
sexual offenses that evidences any express or 
implied intent to preclude local governments 
from also attempting to prohibit and supress 
the difficult problem of the sex o~fende~. 
Therefore, it is our o inion that the cit is 
not reclude in enactin the ordinance in 
un-ess it 1S inconsistent or in 
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The county, in passing their version of §3B-8-5(3) 
(their §15-18-5(3)) were restating their obviously invalid 
view of prostitution. Section 5(3) of the county and city 
massag~ ordinances is directly in conflict with the state 
law. It is not designed to suppress something the state has 
declared to be prostitution. While the state, in addition 
to its prostitution laws, prohibited certain unnatural sex 
acts, under the heading of "sodomy" (§76-5-403 U.C.A.) and 
also prohibited adultery (§76-7-103 U.C.A.) and fornication 
(§76-7-104 U.C.A.) the decision was clearly made that the 
conduct defined as prostitution and deviant sexual conduct 
by the county, was not a crime. The county prostitution 
ordinance, and this portion of the county massage ordinance, 
are not intended to attack "the difficult problem of the 
sex offender" because, in fact, a person engaging in the 
conduct prohibited by the ordinance section at issue here 
is not a sex offender. 
It is appropriate here to refer to the case of In re Lane, 
372 P.2d 897 (Calif. 1962) in which the Supreme Court of 
California stated as follows: 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of 
"re.sorting," after a court trial in the 
Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judi-
cial District on two charges of violating 
§51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code 
which provides: "No person shall resort' 
to any off ice building or to any room used 
or occupied in connection with, or under 
the same rnanagment as any cafe, restaurant 
soft drink bar, liquor establishment, or ' 
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. similar businesses or to any public park 
or to any of the buildings therein or to 
any vacant lot, rooming house, lodging house, 
residence,apartment house, hotel, house 
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose 
of having sexual intercourse with a person 
to whom he or she is not married, or for the 
purpose of performing or participating in 
any lewd act with any such person. 372 P.2d 
at 898. 
The Court, at page 899 of the decision, lists numerous acts 
of sexual intercourse which have been made illegal by the 
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places, 
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibi-
tions and acts against public decency as being outlawed by 
the State of California. Defendant was accused of going 
from her own living room to her own bedroom ''for the purpose 
of having sexual intercourse with a male to whom she was not 
married." 372 P.2d at 898. In striking down the ordinance, 
the court stated: 
Although living in a state of cohabitation and 
adultery is prohibited, neither simple forni-
cation or adultery alone nor living in a state 
of cohabitation and fornication has been made 
a crime in this state. (citations omitted) 
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to 
make sexual intercourse between persons not 
married to each other criminal is in conflict 
with the state law and is void. 372 P.2d at 900. 
\ 
In this state of course, sexual intercourse between unmarried 
persons has been made a crime, although rarely enforced. The 
mere touching without sexual conduct, has not been made a 
c.rime. The city may not add numerous new sex crimes to what 
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the state legislature has declared is the public policy of 
the state. 
POINT II 
SECTION 3B-8-5 (3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH 
SALT LAKE IS INVALID AS DENYIHG EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
IN VIOLATION OF THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
When Salt Lake County passed Title XV Chapter 18 of its 
revised ordinances, its massage ordinance, it appeared to be 
prohibiting, in §5 (3) ~ .. conduct it had already attempted to 
prohibit in §16-23-4 (2) (b), although that ordinance is extremely 
vague and over broad. This ordinance went a step further, however, 
in eliminating the requirements that the act is done for a fee 
and that it is done with the intent to arouse or satisfy the 
sexual desires of either person involved. The City of South 
Salt Lake, by adopting the latter ordinance and not the former, 
has clearly prohibited conduct by a masseur that is not prohibiteol 
to anyone else in its confines.' It is not a crime in the City 
of South Salt Lake, or other cities whose ordinances I have 
checked, for two consenting adults, married or unmarried, for 
a fee or not for a fee, to touch each other wherever they 
please, as long as it is not done in a place open to public 
view (which would render it "lewdness" in violation of §76-9 
702 U.C.A.) and no sexual contact, as defined in State Statute, 
results therefrom. Therefore, if a person is licensed as a 
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masseur, he is subject to imprisonment for the same kind 
of conduct which any other person may engage in with impunity. 
There can be little doubt that a masseur's right to equal 
protection of the law under both State and Federal Constitutions 
is thereby abridged. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in People 
v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975) stated that 
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee of 
like treatment of all those who are similarly 
situated. Classification of persons under the 
criminal law must be under legislation that is 
reasonable and not arbitrary. There must be 
substantial differences having a reasonable 
relationship to the persons involved and the 
public purpose to be achieved. 534 P.2d at 
318. 
Prostitution is prohibited by the State of Utah not only 
be.cause it is an offense to the morality of a majority of its 
citizens, but because it is a widely known and easily proved 
source~of disease and other social ills. All prostitution is 
prohibited for the same reasons, whether it be in the open on 
' 
the street, by a sophisticated telephone solicitation system, 
in massage parlors or wherever else it may be found. No such 
proof of evil can be shown by the city officials who wish to 
stamp out the- conduct at· issue here. But even assuming that 
such could be proved, there is certainly no evidence anywhere 
. 
that such conduct is only offensive and only creates harm when 
preformed by licensed masseurs. Unless the City can show that 
prohibiting such conduct only on the part of licensed masseurs 
is a classification which has a rational basis, it may not 
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prohibit that conduct which would be legal when performed by 
other people, including street prostitutes or call girls. As 
the Supreme Court of California observed, in People v. Romo ,534 
P.2d 1015 (Calif. 1975): 
The constitutional guaranty of equal protection 
of the laws has been judicially defined to mean 
that no person or class of persons shall be 
denied the same protection of the laws which is 
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in 
like circumstances in their lives, liberty and 
property and in their pursuit of happiness. 534 
P.2d at 1020. 
This position is also borne out by.·the case of Gilmore v. 
Green County Democratic Party Executive Committee, 435 F.2d 
487(5th cir. 1970) in which the Federal Circuit Court stated: 
As all know, the State Statute or State action 
which grants to some what it denies to others, 
violated the equal protection provisions of the 
Federal Constitution, unless the deprivation is 
suffered as the result of the State's placing 
persons into different classes, and such class-
ification is a reasonable one. 435 F.2d at 491. 
The City Attorney of the City of South Salt Lake, when confront-
ed in the District Court (oral arguments made off the record in 
Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake, Supreme Court #16,831) 
with this equal protection contention, replied that the City was 
prohibiting the conduct in a place where they had trouble with it. 
He added, that if they had had trouble with such conduct in 
grocery stores, it would have been prohibited there. The argument 
of course, avoids the question at hand. Either the conduct 
proscribed is legal or it is illegal. The fact that licensed 
masseurs may be amcng those who are most likely to engage in 
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the conduct proscribed is not sufficient reason for proscribing 
the conduct. The burden of proof must be on the city to show 
that there was indeed some rational basis for singling out 
one class of people for criminal liability for conduct not pro-
hibited the general public. 
POINT III 
SECTION 3B-8-5 (3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH 
SALT LAKE IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
• 
It is a settled rule of law that a statute written so 
vaguely that it does not set out a clear standard of the be-
havior prohibited, is void qs a denial of due process of law, 
as guaranteed by the 14th amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Constitut~on of 
Utah. That standard was set out, among other places, in 
Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commissioner 286 U.S. 
210, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1932) where the United States 
Supreme Court said: 
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere 
inspection that these general words and phrases 
are so vague and indefinite that any penalty pre-
scribed for there violation constitutes a denial 
of due process of law. It is not the penalty it-
self that is invalid, but the exaction of ·obedience 
to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite 
as to be really no rule or standard at all. (citations 
omitted.) 52 S.Ct. at 568. 
In a previous case involving the regulation of massage parlors, 
Jensen v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 
(Utah 1974) this court invalidated a county ordinance on the 
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basis of vagueness, in the following language: 
The trial court was of the opinion that the 
language of the ordinance was so vague and un-
certain as to render it invalid. We conclude 
that that determination by the trial court was 
correct. A person who might wish to enter the 
field covered by the ordinance would be unable 
to determine from this wording what qualifications 
or skill would be necessary to qualify for a 
license. It is noted that the ordinances uses 
the term'fnassage therapist" but nowhere is that 
term defined. 530 P.2d at 4. 
Unlike the County Prostitution Ordinance which prohibits 
"lewd fondling or touching ... with the intent to arouse or 
• 
satisfy the sexual desires .... " and ~ _ - the State Statute on 
forcible sexual abuse,(§76-5-404 U.C.A. (1953) as amended), 
which prohibits_ touching "the genitals of another ... with 
the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, 
without the consent of the other person," the ordinance at issue 
here does not require any intent. It also does not require the 
act to be for compensation. This gives lower courts a wide latitul 
as to how to interpret the ordinance. This court, in State v. 
Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1973) ruled that touching for the 
purposes of forcible sexual abuse could be done even through a 
layer of clothing (at page 1390-1391). Without the requirement 
of any intent, a masseur may be convicted for brushing past 
or bumping into the genitals of a customer, even when the customer 
is fully clothed, or is covered with a towel as most customers 
are where defendant was employed at the time of this incident. 
Reading the ordinance so as not to require any kind of sexual 
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intent for a conviction, certainly renders the ordinance so 
vague and overbroad as to constitute the denial of due process 
of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the ordinance under which defendant was convicted 
is in direct conflict with the several constitutional and statutory 
provisions stated above, the court should declare §3B-8-5 (3.) of 
the Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake void and 
of no effect, and should order the prosecution of defendant under 
tltle named section of the ordinance dismissed and defendant dis-
charged. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZJ day of July, 1980. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant postage prepaid, 
to Clint Balmforth, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 2500 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, this~day of July, 19f 
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